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scientific testimony, grounded in the methods and procedures
of science.... [which] will assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine facts and issues concerning defendant's intent
and knowledge. The testimony is based on scientific knowl-
edge, relating to hypotheses that can be and have been tested,
techniques that have been subjected to peer review and publi-
cation, subject to reasonably acceptable potential rates of
error, subject to standards controlling the techniques opera-
tion, and sufficiently accepted within the relevant scientific.
. . community.50
50 Bergman, supra note 32, at 16.
51 Id.
The motion should also stress that the evidence is necessary to
provide the defendant a fair trial guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and
as part of the "right to produce witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment... 51 The motion must be supported by memoranda and
other points of authority to persuade the court to allow such testimony.
Even though the Virginia courts have not formally adopted Daubert,
such a motion places great importance on the relevance and reliability of
scientific evidence, which is the backbone of Virginia's evidence rules
concerning scientific expert testimony.
DNA EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA
. BY: STEVEN M. JOHNSON
Although the admissability and reliability of DNA evidence made
big headlines during O.J. Simpson's trial just last year, problems sur-
rounding DNA testing were around well before the "trial of the century."
The Capital Defense Digest published an article in 1992 on DNA
evidence, 1 but advances in technology, literature, case law, and defense
tactics in the intervening years warrant another look at DNA evidence.
I. Technological Advances In DNA Analysis 2
The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) form of DNA testing was
first developed by Kary Mullis in 1984.3 This simple technique revolu-
tionized the study of DNA to such an extent that Ms. Mullis was awarded
the Nobel prize in 1994.4 PCR is generally used when the sample
containing DNA is degraded or to small to perform the more accurate
RFLP test.
5
Imagine two Leggos, one red and one white, stuck together. Those
Leggos are snapped apart and a new white Leggo attaches to the old red
Leggo and anew red Leggo attaches to the old white Leggo. This process
repeats over and over, creating millions of paired Leggos. This is
essentially how the PCR process is used to replicate DNA.
The most common form of PCR is the DQA1 test. This test is
performed by mixing the sample (or template DNA) with the Taq DNA
Polymerase enzyme, the four DNA building blocks, 6 and DNA probes
or primer. This mixture is heated to separate the template DNA into
single strands. As the mixture cools, the primers bind to both strands of
the DQA1 gene. The Taq DNA Polymerase then recognizes the bond of
I Christopher J. Lonsbury, The Current State of DNA Evidence,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2 p. 11 (1992). Mr. Lonsbury's
article focuses on RFLP DNA testing mechanics, probability calcula-
tions, case law through early 1992 and some advice for defense counsel.
2 This section is a simplified explanation of the PCR test. See,
Kamrin T. MacKnight, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): The
Second Generation of DNA Analysis Methods Takes the Stand, 9 Santa
Clara Computer & High-Tech. LJ. 287 (1993), and Howard Coleman &
Eric Swenson, DNA in the Courtroom (1994).
3 MacKnight, supra note 2, at 300-01.
4 Coleman & Swenson supra note 2, at 53.
primer and template as a place to catalyze the making of new DNA,
identical to the old DNA.7 The process is repeated thirty times, creating
literally millions of DQA1 genes.8 The DNA is again separated into two
strands, allowing probes to bind with specific sequences present in the
newly created (amplified) DNA.9 Nylon is then pressed against the
sample and half the sample (a "dot") attaches to the nylon in a distinct
pattern. This pattern can then be compared to the known samples for
identification. 10
Kamrin MacKnight identifies four concerns with PCR testing: "(1)
'Allelic drop-out'; (2) the sensitivity of the test and the potential for
contamination; (3) the small number of laboratories conducting the test;
and (4) interpretation problems."11
"Allelic drop-out" describes a situation where the test procedure
preferentially amplifies one of two alleles (various types of each gene)
to such an extent that it would appear a heterozygous individual (carrying
both a dominant and recessive gene) is homozygous (carrying either both
dominant or both recessive genes). 12 Apparently this problem only
occurs when the testing temperature drops significantly below 94*
Celsius.
13
Because PCR is such a sensitive test, another possible problem is
that contaminating DNA might be present in the sample which would
disguise the sample DNA. 14 This problem is of particular concern in
criminal cases where a crime scene is not as sterile as a laboratory.
Although one possible source of contamination is non-human DNA, the
probes in the test system do not recognize, much less amplify non-
primate DNA (leaving open the unlikely scenario of contamination by
Id.
Adenine, guanine, thymine and cytosine.
Coleman & Swenson, supra note 2, at 53.
Id.
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gorilla). Contamination by human sources is also not likely to result in
aberrant results, but an FBI study in which contamination was induced
did reveal contamination where saliva was mixed with the sample.
15
The small number of laboratories using PCR is another concern.
The small number is attributable to the high cost of starting a PCR lab and
training.
The final concern is with the interpretation of the results. MacKnight
suggests that, "some witnesses have testified to discrepancies in the
reading of the dot blots."'16 The dots on the blot differ in intensity. In the
past, if a dot was not intense enough, the test became suspect and led to
questions of interpreting the intensity of the dots. This ambiguity has
been remedied by a control dot. Now, if the test dot is not as intense as
the control dot, the test results are suspect.
17
II. Current Virginia Law
Generally speaking, DNA evidence, including PCR testing, is
admissible in Virginia courts. 18 The Virginia General Assembly enacted
§ 19.2-270.5 during its 1990 session. It provides:
In any criminal proceeding, DNA... testing shall be deemed
to be a reliable scientific technique and the evidence of a DNA
profile comparison may be admitted to prove or disprove the
identity of any person. This section shall not otherwise limit
the introduction of any relevant evidence bearing upon any
question at issue before the court.19
Michael Satcher challenged this provision in Satcher v. Common-
wealth,20 contending that the statute is facially unconstitutional, creating
an "evidentiary presumption that impermissibly shifts the burden of
proof."21 The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed, deciding that the
language "may be admitted" indicates that the evidence should be treated
as a reliable scientific technique. 22 The court held that the statute
"'merely creates a rule of evidence and does not determine the guilt of the
accused,' 23 and the discretion allowed the trial judge is simply admin-
istration of rules of evidence.24 The Virginia Supreme Court also denied
Satcher's claim that the statute is void for vagueness. 25
Although the Virginia Supreme Court allowed the evidence in
Satcher, it declined to hold that DNA evidence is admissible under all
circumstances. Drawing from Spencer v. Commonwealth,26 the Virginia
Supreme Court indicated that the trial court can shield thejury from DNA
15 Id. at 318.
16 Id. at 320.
17 Id.
18 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (Va.
1990) (Spencer IV).
19 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-270.5 (1995).
20 Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 421 S.E.2d 821 (Va.
1992).
21 Id. at 242,421 S.E.2d 834.
22 Id.
23 Id. (quoting Dooley v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 32, 53, 92
S.E.2d 348, 350 (1956)).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 242,421 S.E.2d 834-35.
26 Spencer IV, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609.
27 Satcher, 244 Va. at 244, 421 S.E.2d at 835 (citing Spencer IV,
240 Va. at 98, 393 S.E.2d at 621).
28 Id. at 243, 421 S.E.2d at 835.
29 Husske v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 30, 448 S.E.2d 331
(Va.App. 1994) (Husske I).
evidence when in a specific case "the evidence is ... inherently
unreliable." 27 Further, the court's opinion demonstrates that evidence
may be introduced at trial to refute DNA evidence.
28
Husske v. Commonwealth, a case which involved an alleged rape,
addresses whether the trial court should pay an indigent defendant's costs
for an expert to combat the state's DNA evidence.29 In Husske, the trial
court refused a motion requesting the appointment of a DNA expert, but,
prior to trial, the judge appointed an attorney well versed in DNA analysis
as co-counsel. In the first Husske opinion, the Virginia court of appeals
ruled that Ake v. Oklahoma30 entitled Mr. Husske to a court appointed
DNA expert.
31
InAke, the United States Supreme Court required the state to furnish
a defendant with a psychiatric expert when the defendant was indigent
and the sanity of the defendant was central to the case; the rationale inAke
applies to non-psychiatric experts as well.32 Applying Ake, the panel
reasoned that 1) the private interest at stake is uniquely compelling; 2) no
undue burden would be placed on the state; and, 3) the significant
controversy surrounding DNA evidence made an expert necessary to the
defense team.
33
The Commonwealth was granted an en banc hearing.34 The court,
however, deadlocked 4-4, which, under the Court of Appeals procedure,.
affirmed the trial court ruling (i.e., that the defendant was not entitled to
an Ake expert).35 Neither the one paragraph majority opinion, nor the
dissent reveal the court's reasoning. Husske is now pending before the
Virginia Supreme Court. Although the answer to the Ake question is still
undecided by Virginia Courts, a motion for the appointment of the expert
must be made, both to preserve another issue for appeal and because the
trial judge may find an expert warranted under the circumstances,
especially in a capital case.
An Ake motion is proper whenever the prosecution is relying upon
DNA evidence. The state will be using an expert to prove the link
between the defendant and the sample. It is necessary that the defendant
have an independent expert who can explain the DNA process and to
assist in the cross examination of the prosecution expert; the independent
expert can also prepare a defense to the DNA evidence. The state's expert
is unlikely to help the defendant prepare a case in which the expert's own
theories must be refuted. Further, a DNA expert will help the defense in
any proceedings prior to trial in which the admissibility of the DNA
evidence is at issue. Depriving the defendant of a DNA expert is a denial
of due process. 36
30 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
31 Husske I, 19 Va. at 44-45,448 S.E.2d at 339.
32 See, e.g., O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 685, 364
S.E.2d 491,498 (1988) (court appointment of forensic expert); United
Statesv. Patterson, 724 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1984) (fingerprint specialist);
Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975) (firearms expert);
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th. Cir. 1980) (pathologist); United
States v. Fogarty, 558 F.Supp. 856 (E.D. Tenn 1982) (handwriting
analyst); Bowan v. Eyman, 324 F.Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 1970) (serologist).
See also Thornton v. State, 255 Ga. 434, 339 S.E.2d 240 (1986) (dental
expert); Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204,232 S.E.2d 233 (1977) (narcot-
ics analyst).
33 Husske I, 19 Va.. at 33-37, 448 S.E.2d at 335-340.
34 Husske v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 914, 462 S.E.2d 120
(1995) (en banc) (Husske II).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g.,Dubose v. State 662 So.2d 1189 (Ala. 1995) (defendant
entitled to appointment of a DNA expert).
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I. Defense Strategies & Tactics 37
Defense attorney andlawprofessorBarry Scheck, ofO.J. Simpson's
"Dream Team" fame, offers seven points to attack DNA admissibility
and weight, which incorporate the recommendations of the NRC:
38
1) differences between application of DNA analysis in diagnostics/
paternity suits and in forensics analysis; 2) collection and handling (lab
protocol); 3) the procedure used for identifying patterns; 4) the procedure
used for declaring a match; 5) the identification of potential artifacts; 6)
the database; and 7) quality assurance.
39
The differences between application of DNA analysis in diagnos-
tics/paternity and its application in forensics relates to the reliability of
the results. Some prosecutors may try to elicit testimony that DNA
testing has been used for over fifty years. While this is true, it has only
been since the mid-1980s that DNA testing has been used in forensics.
Defense attorneys can focus on the differences between the two applica-
tions to throw doubt on the reliability of the results.40
Lab protocol for DNA testing is not regulated and may be changed
by the labs at their will. Scheck states that, "lack of protocol used and
tested over time severely limits the verifiable reliability of the SBI's
methods and results. '41 Extreme care must be taken to ensure that
contamination of the sample does not occur (this is especially true with
PCR). If the lab does not have a protocol, or if its protocol does not
conform to the NRC's recommendations, the procedure may lead to
contamination.
The procedure for identification of patterns is also subject to attack.
Controls should be used to avoid inaccuracies and patterns should be
analyzed by methods other than sight for accurate measurements. Sight
lacks precision and is subject to bias on the part of the tester. "Patterns
in suspect and evidence samples must be identified separately and
independently." 42 Any violation of this implicates reliability of the
match.
The matching procedure is dependent upon the deviation in the
position of the bands of DNA. Each laboratory determines its matching
rules, but a difference of over two standard deviations is unreliable.
Matching also relates to the probability of occurrence. The same match-
ing rule must have been applied to both the database as well as to the
forensic sample.
Current DNA testing cannot provide 100% certainty that two
samples are exact matches. Scheck states, "a 'match' cannot be inter-
preted without knowledge of the population frequencies of the patterns
at the loci examined.' 43 Because the whole world has not been DNA
tested, laboratories rely upon databases generated by testing samples of
37 National Research Council (U.S.) Committee on DNA Technol-
ogy in Forensic Science, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992).
This report (NRC report) on DNA evidence has become an invaluable
tool for a defense attorney facing DNA evidence.
38 Barry Scheck, Meeting DNA Evidence, North Carolina Acad-
emy of Trial Lawyers Death Penalty Litigation Seminar (1992).
39 Id. at 6-10.
40 Id. at 6.
the population. The problem with relying on databases is that the
databases may not be large enough. Additionally, the prosecution may
use the "product rule" to determine aprobability. To illustrate the product
rule, imagine there are four matches between particular samples. If the
database is made up of 500 people and there is one match at each locus,
the product rule would yield the probability of 1 in 62,500,000,000 (1/
500 * 1/500 * 1/500 *1/500). Professor Scheck argues, however, that,
[t]he product rule is an inaccurate way to calculate the prob-
ability because it wrongly assumes that the matches at each
locus are statistically independent of each other. By analogy,
if a population sample of Europeans showed that 1 in 10 had
blond hair, 1 in 10 had blue eyes, and 1 in 10 had fair skin, it
would be wrong to multiply those frequencies together, since
those traits tend to occur together in the subpopulation of
Nordic people. Among the Nordic people, the frequency of all
three traits occurring together may be 1 in 20 rather than 1 in
1,000. 44
The product rule is also flawed because it assumes that people from
different geographic areas intermix freely (known as the Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium). If the suspect is from a small, rural area where the people
have been in-breeding for years, the genetic traits will be more common
than in the general population.
Use of the ceiling principle is recommended by the NRC, but is not
currently used by any laboratory. 45 This principle suggests that the
results from several subpopulations should be separated out from the
general population and studied closely. "The largest frequency of occur-
rence of an allele at a given locus in any of these subpopulations, or 5%,
whichever is larger, should be the ceiling frequency." 46 Multiplying
together the ceiling frequency of each loci will give a more accurate
indication of probability. Scheck also believes that the laboratory's error
rate should be calculated and entered into the equation for probability.
47
Independent quality checks should be performed to determine the
laboratory's quality assurance. Some laboratories do not perform these,
and the NRC opines that "no laboratory should let its results with a new
DNA typing method be used in court, unless it has undergone [indepen-
dent quality checks]." 48
A defense attorney should keep in mind that these attacks are
relevant to both admissibility and weight. As noted above, the Virginia
Supreme Court left the door open for DNA evidence to be excluded if
there was a showing that the evidence was so tainted the jury should be
shielded from it.
41 Id. at 7.
42 Id. at 8.
43 Id. at 9.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 10.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 10 (quoting NRC report supra note 37 at 2-5, 6).
